84) and will be accepted here as well, subject to the following qualification.
There is another manifestation of power which is not dependent on the influencee's perception. This may be called "manipulative power" or "ecological control," and is based on such methods as control of information, restriction of alternatives, conditioning, or in any way modifying the influencee's environment. Tedeschi and Bonoma provide a good description of the phenomenon:
When P has the ability to control critical aspects of W's environment in such a way that the new environment will bring about a desired change in W's behavior, then P has "ecological" control over W (1972, p. 15).
Obviously, this is not the type of power that has been considered in the marketing channel literature. The omission may or may not represent a serious deficiency. If it is conceivable that one channel member's control over another's information, alternatives, environment, etc., could be extensive and effective enough to amount to a significant source of power, then the perception-based power commonly examined in marketing represents only a subset of power rather than the complete domain of the construct. In any case, the extent of manipulative power may never be known, since it is not clear how it could be measured. The intent here is simply to recognize the existence of the phenomenon, acknowledgment which has not yet occurred in the marketing channel literature.
Conflict: Definition and Elaboration
Conflict, according to one authoritative definition, is "tension between two or more social entities (individuals, groups, or larger organizations) which arises from incompatibility of actual or desired responses" (Raven and Kruglanski 1970, p. 70) . The distinction made between actual and desired responses is suggestive of the common taxonomic practice of separating conflict into two or more categories of phenomena, usually representing a behavorial and a perceptual/attitudinal dimension. Raven and Kruglanski, for instance, refer to "manifest" and "underlying" conflict (1970, p. 71; also Deutsch 1969), with manifest conflict meaning overt actions and underlying conflict meaning that which involves interpersonal attractions, interests, and desires. Others, too, identify both psychological and behavorial levels of conflict without attempting to designate either as "true" conflict. Thomas, for instance, specifies a "frustration-conceptualization-behavioroutcome" sequence (1976, pp. 894-912), while Pondy classifies conflict into five "stages":
(1) latent conflict: underlying sources of conflict; (2) perceived conflict: perception only, when no conditions of latent conflict exist; (3) felt conflict: tension, anxiety, disaffection in addition to the perception; (4) manifest conflict: behavior which blocks another's goal achievement;
(5) conflict aftermath: post-conflict conduct, either resolution or suppression (1967, pp. 300-305).
Obviously, some minor partitioning can approximate Pondy's or Thomas' terms to the underlying-manifest or perceptual/attitudinal-behavorial dichotomy. It is not being suggested that all the conflict schemata reported above represent the same conceptual dichotomization, but there does seem to be a recurrence of underlying factors. Definition of conflict in a marketing channel setting has been provided by Lusch (1976a, p. 383) , who accepts the "latent-affective-manifest" framework, Rosenberg (1974, Channel conflict is a situation in which one channel member perceives another channel member to be engaged in behavior that is preventing or impeding him from achieving his goals (p. 283).
According to Ster and Gorman (1969, p. 156 ) and Etgar (1979) , channel conflict is present:
. when a component (channel member) perceives the behavior of another component to be impeding the attainment of its goals or the effective performance of its instrumental behavior patterns (p. 61-62).
Adopting the consensus, channel conflict will be considered to be the perception on the part of a channel member that its goal attainment is being impeded by another, with stress or tension the result. Terms such as manifest conflict and affective or felt conflict can be applied to the impeding of goal attainment and stress or tension, respectively, but the view here is that "conflict" refers only to the perception that another is being obstructive, with tension the implicit accompaniment.
It has been suggested that conflict is virtually inevitable in marketing channels. Most agree that this condition is due primarily to the functional interdependence between channel members (e.g., Assael 1968; Cadotte and Ster 1979, p. 134; Lusch 1976a; Mallen
The act of exchange is composed of two elements: a sale and a purchase. It is to the advantage of the seller to obtain the highest return possible from such an exchange, and the exact opposite is the desire of the buyer. . . . This is not to say the exchange act itself is a conflict. Indeed, the act or transaction is a sign that the element of price conflict has been resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both principals. Only along the road to this mutual satisfaction point or exchange price do the principals have opposing interests (p. 25).
Therefore, since exchange characterizes relations between channel members, so too will conflict.
Power, Conflict, and the Current Status of Theory
Of those who have recognized a connection between power and conflict, not all share the same perspective. Power has been designated as both the independent and dependent variable in the relationship. Raven Curiously, empirical work in the area of marketing channels, generally of cross-sectional nature (see Ta- ble 1), has consistently assumed power to be the causative factor with respect to conflict, as well as other variables. To trace development of the theory of power and conflict in marketing channels, a review of the major contributions to this stream of research is now presented.
Empirical Contributions
The empirical genesis of channel power theory was the El-Ansary and Stem (1972) attempt to specify the determinants of power. Remarkably prominent considering the absence of significant results, this study failed to establish a relationship between a channel member's power and its presumed antecedents, dependence and sources of power. Attributing the inconclusive findings to the lack of a clear power structure in the particular channel sampled (heating and cooling equipment distributors, a conventional channel), El-Ansary and Stem did provide some guidance, in terms of hypotheses and measures, from which fur-I ther research could proceed. (For instance, El-Ansary (1975), in another look at elemental constructs, performed a factor-analytic verification of Emerson's "motivational investment" and "availability of alternatives" as determinants of channel-member dependence.)
Noting El-Ansary and Stern's complaint about the peculiarities of their sample, Hunt and Nevin (1974) investigated a channel with a more explicitly-defined power structure, i.e., a franchise system. They found franchisor power to be a function of the sources of power available, and also reported that franchisee satisfaction is increased when noncoercive sources of power, as opposed to coercive sources, are used. (Noncoercive sources of power were operationalized as rewards, or assistances; coercive, as punishments.) This latter result was replicated by Lusch (1977) and Michie (1978) in automobile channels, and by Wilkinson (1981) in a beer channel. Lusch and Brown (1982) found noncoercive power sources to be inversely related to power, but acknowledged that this result could have been due to problems with their attributional power measure.
In other power-related work, Wilkinson (1974) produced results indicating a weak relationship between power and sources of power in a distribution channel for household durable goods. Etgar (1978b) showed reward and coercive power sources to be positively related to channel power. Brown and Frazier (1978) , adopting a different perspective, argued that their finding of an inverse relationship between manufacturer power and certain power sources (reward, coercive, legal, which they called "influence strategies") indicates that the more manufacturer power is perceived by dealers, the less those power sources need to be used. Walker (1972) , in a laboratory setting, found power to be evocative of dissatisfaction on the part of those who are subject to it, and Wilkinson (1979) developed limited evidence that power can increase a channel member's own satisfaction, but was unable to establish a relationship between an entity's satisfaction and the power to which it is subject. Also, Etgar's (1976a) finding that an administratively coordinated channel produces superior operational efficiency to a noncoordinated system may be interpreted to mean that power has a positive effect on channel performance.
In an effort to extend Hunt and Nevin's findings to a noncontractual channel, Etgar (1976b) surveyed independent insurance agents in a conventional channel arrangement and reported a strong correlation between insurers' power sources and their power over agents' business practices. Other results were a significant, but weak, positive relationship between agents' dependence (on insurers) and insurers' power, and an inverse relationship between agents' countervailing power and insurers' power. The operational distinction offered by Etgar between insurer power sources and agent dependence was, in effect, one between nonmonetary assistances (power sources) and overall financial reliance (dependence). Measures of countervailing power featured insurer dependence-surrogates such as "degree of customer loyalty" and "agent's premium volume," which, presumably, could serve as bases for threats and rewards. Phillips (1981) reinforced Etgar's principal results by reporting a positive association between wholesaler dependence on suppliers (and customers) and supplier (customer) power over the wholesaler. Phillips also identified an inverse relationship between supplier/customer power and wholesaler countervailing power, as well as an inverse relationship between wholesaler countervailing power and wholesaler dependence on supplier/customers. In a somewhat related finding, Porter (1974) found dealer countervailing power to be inversely related to performance from the supplier's perspective.
In another study Etgar (1977) found environmental factors explained very little of the variance in channel member power, which may support (or at least not falsify) the proposition that sources of power and dependence are the principal determinants of power in a channel. Finally, again on the subject of countervailing power, Wilkinson and Kipnis (1978) found a wide variety of business organizations less likely to use coercive sources of power and more likely to use noncoercive sources as the target of influence was considered to be more powerful.
The first to explicitly incorporate conflict into the analysis of channel power was Lusch (1976a). (Walker's previously cited experiment (1972) did reveal that powerful bargainers were capable of securing agreements unfavorable to less powerful bargainers, which is compatible with the hypothesis that the existence of power produces dyadic conflict, though this conclusion was not explicitly expressed. There was also an experimental study by Stern, Schultz, and Grabner (1973) which provided very limited evidence of a relationship between the use of power bases and conflict. However, it is arguable whether this study can legitimately be included in the channel literature since the authors did not couch it in a channel context and, unlike the few other experiments cited, there was no attempt to simulate a channel setting.) In the distributive system for automobiles, Lusch found a significant positive association between intrachannel conflict as perceived by dealers and coercive sources of franchisor power, with conflict negatively related to noncoercive sources of power. Lusch interpreted these results to mean that coercive sources of power increase conflict in the channel, while noncoercive sources reduce conflict. In response to Etgar (1978a), Lusch (1978) construed as further evidence of an inverse relationship between conflict and satisfaction. Dwyer's other findings, that channel member A's satisfaction is positively related to (a) perceived self-control over decision variables and (b) channel member B's perception of A's power bases, support the porposition that countervailing power "is a chief contributor to satisfaction" (pp. 55-7). Finally, recognizing the commonality between cooperativeness and noncoercive power sources, Dwyer's results may also be interpreted to indicate a positive relationship between the use of such power sources and the satisfaction of a channel member subject to them (since cooperation and satisfaction are positively correlated). Two other recent studies have touched on important aspects of power in marketing channels. Roering (1977) , in an experiment, found dependence was directly related to bargaining agreement and inversely related to competitive bargaining behavior. Guiltinan, Rejab, and Rodgers (1980) reported that a franchisee's perceived influence over a franchisor, uncertainty reduction, and provision of helpful information by a franchisor explain a significant amount of channel work coordination. However, since these studies Table 2 is a compact portrayal of the character and deficiencies of existing channel power and conflict research. Some of the more serious of these deficiencies are summarized below.
Methodological Problems

Poor Operationalizations
In a majority of the studies that have contributed "substantive" findings to power and conflict theory, i.e., those listed in Figure 1 and Table 2, it is debatable whether some key measures are really measuring what they are supposed to (see Table 2 for details). Power is an especially troublesome construct. Of course, power may be an inherently difficult attribute to measure, but many of the reported operationalizations clearly do not capture the idea of "ability to alter behavior," the consensus definition. Wilkinson (1974) seems to be on the right track, if only his measure of "maximum possible effect" on policies could be accurately assessed and reported by respondents, which is questionable.
Insufficient Evidence of Reliability and Validity
Most of the reported research in this area seems to be fairly conscientious in providing "content" validity Table 2 ), probably only the Lusch work (1976a Lusch work ( , 1976b Lusch work ( , 1977 gives adequate attention to construct validation by to-day's standards. Of course, Walker (1972) was primarily measuring manipulable or observable variables, and much of the work cited above was done before the field acquired such heightened concern over construct validity.
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Informant Bias
Nearly all the research reviewed here has utilized what is known as "key informant" data collection methodology, in which "the social scientist obtains information about the group under study through a member who occupies such a role as to be well-informed" (Campbell 1955 ). Some limited justification for the technique is found in Campbell and also Seidler (1974) . Unfortunately, as Phillips (1981) 
Conclusion
In view of the severe methodological shortcomings permeating channel power and conflict research to which none of the work cited, even the most central and seminal, has been immune, serious questions must be raised concerning just what can be legitimately concluded about the subject. As an anonymous JM reviewer succinctly expressed it: "All fields go through a shake-out period and the mistakes we have made have their parallels in many other fields, [but] if one sums up all these weaknesses, there is some question as to whether we really know anything about power and conflict in distribution" (italics added). This is an unfortunate commentary on the past decade of research in the area. But every scientific void has a silver lining: As the deficiencies in this area are recognized, perhaps more marketing researchers will regard channel theory as an opportunity and be attracted to it.
Conceptual Issues
In addition to the numerous methodological problems, channel power and conflict research has revealed the need for some clarification and specification regarding the nature of the constructs involved. The following section is a conceptual discussion, with methodological overtones, of these components of channel power and conflict theory, proceeding from left to right in Figure 1 .
Sources of Power: The Exercised-Unexercised Dimension
Some of the most prominent work in this area is undermined by deficient conceptualization of the construct "power sources," a lapse that may have resulted in grossly misleading findings.
Among the most central relationships of channel power and conflict theory are those developed by Hunt and Nevin (1974) and Lusch (1976a) regarding the impact of sources of power on conflict and satisfaction. In particular, Hunt and Nevin found that noncoercive sources of power increase satisfaction, while coercive sources of power reduce satisfaction within the marketing channel. Lusch reported that noncoercive sources of power reduce intrachannel conflict and coercive sources increase conflict. These results, of course, are perfectly consistent with the intuitive sense that coercive power sources (punishments) would tend to increase conflict and reduce satisfaction on the part of channel members subject to them, while noncoercive sources (rewards, as operationalized by Hunt and Nevin and Lusch) would do the opposite. However, the relationships identified were somewhat weaker than might be expected, and this may have been due to the operationalization of the independent variables in a way that did not distinguish between exercised (or activated) and unexercised (or latent) sources of power. a punishment ever a reward? Always a reward? (p. 23) He suggests resolution in terms of the subject's "baseline of expectations": That which improves the value position relative to the baseline of expectations is a reward (a positive sanction in Baldwin's lexicon); a deprivation relative to this baseline is a punishment, or negative sanction.
Obviously, implementation of this approach, which would involve the collection of data on channel members' prior expectations, would also add an additional complication to any research instrument. A more objective, and workable, classification method may be to distinguish coercive and reward power sources on the basis of latitude for deviation in a favorable or unfavorable direction. Coercive power sources can be defined as those potential actions with a natural limit in the positive or favorable direction, but great latitude for deviation in the negative direction. For example, delivery can only be so prompt (the natural limit would be instantaneous delivery), but there is an unlimited degree of delay possible. Therefore, the managerial action expressed as "slow delivery" or "delay of delivery" is a coercive power source. On the other hand, reward power sources are those actions naturally limited in the negative or unfavorable direction, but with much latitude for favorable deviation. An example of this would be the provision of service. The absence of service is the negative limit, but there is indefinite potential for the provision of service. Therefore, "providing service" is the proper expression of this reward power source. Some other examples, which should help clarify this taxonomy, appear in , an appropriate importance weighting procedure for these power sources should capture the dimensions of "motivational investment" and "availability outside the A-B relation" specified by Emerson (1962) . For example, indications by a channel member (as in survey responses) of "how important it is to him/her for this supplier to provide these assistances" could accomplish this purpose. While such a procedure may be criticized as a combined measure of sources of power and dependence, if it is considered reasonable to operationalize power sources as importance-weighted, then it is also reasonable to conclude that dependence is a component or dimension of these power sources rather than a separate phenomenon.
The following proposition is offered, therefore: While there seems to be a consensus that the term power be used to designate the potential or ability to change another's behavior, it is hereby proposed that the term exercised (or activated or achieved) power refers to the actual alteration of behavior (see Wrong 1968, pp. 677-9). Terms such as influence or control have been offered for this purpose in the past, but such usage promotes unnecessary confusion. Rather than arbitrarily selecting terms so commonly used as synonyms to designate such vastly distinct constructs, surely it would be preferable to employ more self-explanatory language, such as power for the ability and exercised or activated power for the actual changing. It is hoped that clearer designation of these constructs will contribute to a greater awareness of the divergent consequences that may follow from exercised as opposed to possessed, but unexercised, power. Analogous to the argument in the section on exercised and unexercised power sources, the following propositions, shown in Figure 2(b) , would be worthy of test: P6: Exercised power, i.e., actually altering a channel member's behavior, will decrease the satisfaction of that channel member and increase intrachannel conflict. P7: Unexercised power will increase satisfaction and decrease intrachannel conflict.
One distinction needs to be made between the exercise of power and the exercise of power sources. The exercise of power sources refers to an activity: the granting of rewards or imposition of punishments. The exercise of power refers to a result or outcome: the alteration of another's behavior, irrespective of the means used to accomplish it. For this reason, the language activated or achieved power may be preferred to represent the construct.
A natural question at this point is: What exactly is the sequence of events by which power becomes exercised power, by which the potential becomes actualized? The process may be visualized as involving a communication mediator, typically a request or command (Figure 4a ), which has conventionally been known as an "influence attempt." (Incidentally, there will typically be a communication variable intervening between power sources and their exercise as well, as depicted in Figure 4( To this, the answer is emphatic: There is no such thing as an unsuccessful attempt to exercise power when power is present. Power means the ability, not the inability, to alter behavior. Its exercise is at the discretion of the power holder. If an attempt to exercise power is unsuccessful, it is merely confirmation that the power did not exist in the first place. The attempt at exercise, therefore, is revealed as an attempt to exercise nonpower. (Those who regard power as a force vector subject to the offsetting influence of "countervailing" power, rather than the net of the two forces, will not accept this interpretation. But to those who do regard power as only one force vector, consider that this position is incompatible with the prevailing definition of power as the ability to alter behavior. This ability is a net result of a number of forces, including the power sources of the power holder, the countervailing power of the power subject, and perhaps environmental forces. So if power is a force vector, subject to offsetting forces, then a new definition will have to be found because the force vector could be present without the ability, due to these offsetting forces.) This point can be visualized with the assistance of Figure 5 . Power can be thought of as the ability to alter the behavior of a designated target over a certain set of decision variables, to various degrees, at certain points in time (adding some specificity to the Dahl  treatment (1957, pp. 202-3) ). Given these dimensions, power can be expressed as a "volume." The fact that X is actually a discrete variable should not impair the analysis. Also, the "degree" dimension can be considered to incorporate an importance or instrumentality component.
FIGURE 4 (a) The Process of Power Exercise
If channel member A had the ability to alter any of channel member B's decisions to any extent desired at any time, channel member A's "volume of power" over B would be the cube XYZ. But if A can only alter some of B's decisions (x) to a limited degree (y), some of the time (z), his/her power volume is actually only xyz. Within xyz, A has power over B; outside xyz, A does not. If A attempts to alter B's behavior and does not succeed, obviously A is attempting to operate outside of xyz, to influence a decision over which he/she has no power, at least at that time, to that degree. To illustrate, consider any point in the space directly above xyz. For A to attempt to exercise power over B there would result in the successful change of the intended decision variable, but only to degree y. A would be unsuccessful in altering B's behavior beyond y. Since A was attempting to exercise power or change B's behavior to a degree beyond y, this is an unsuccessful attempt to exercise power, actually nonpower, since A had no power at that degree in excess of y.
At any point directly to the right of xyz, A cannot influence B's decisions to any degree, and points directly in front of xyz represent times, or occasions, when A has no power over B.
At the least, the foregoing discussion should emphasize that the nature and expression of power in marketing channels is somewhat more complex than has been suggested in the literature so far, and that the current state of research has been inadequate to deal with it.
Countervailing Power
In the interest of developing better operational measures of countervailing power, better conceptualization of the construct is advisable. An attempt to provide it follows.
Power refers to the ability of channel member A to control the decision variables of channel member B. Countervailing power is channel member B's ability to inhibit channel member A's power over B's decision variables (perhaps a better term than "countervailing power" would be "countervailing of power").2 Countervailing power does not refer to B's ability to control A's decision variables. That is B's power over A and represents a parallel structure (Figure 6(a) ). There may be some overlap between the two sets of decision variables, but they are unlikely to be identical for entities at two different levels in a channel.
However, countervailing power does represent power. B's ability to get A not to do something A would otherwise have done (countervailing power) is formally equivalent to B's ability to get A to do something A would not otherwise have done (power), since both involve potential alteration of behavior. The only operational difference is the target decision variable set. In Dahl's terms, different segments of the "scope" of power would be involved (1957, pp. 202-3; see also Wrong 1968, pp. 673-4).
It is also proposed that the sources of a channel member's countervailing power will be the same as the sources of his/her power (see Figure 6(b) ). However, in most manufacturer-dominated channels, the range of power sources for a dealer is likely to be much narrower than what is available to the manufacturer.
Since manufacturer or supplier power is typically and correctly measured by the perceptions of the dealer (not that the measures are valid, only the perspective), Of course, disconfirmation of such a hypothesis would be consistent with the contrary view that a channel entity with countervailing power will be able to thwart goal impediment and, therefore, increase its satisfaction. P9: In a channel dyad, one entity's perception of conflict, satisfaction, and performance will be inversely related to the perceptions reported by the other channel entity.
Conflict
Furthermore, the behavorial consequences of such perceptual disparities could also be examined. For instance, would differences in satisfaction level between a supplier and dealers adversely affect channel performance?
Conclusion
Based on the belief that channel power and conflict theory is at a pivotal stage of development, this paper has attempted to outline the conceptual foundations and empirical content of the subject area, and to point up some issues that remain to be resolved. The hope is that this effort contributes to a much needed process of refinement by which channel power and conflict theory finally arrives at a mature stage of development, in which the relationships posited are supportable enough to be, among other things, useful to channel managers.
